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“Assertions Process” to a New Level to Foster Open 
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Directorate, NRO Infrastructure Support Planning Branch, Engineering Group, at the National 
Reconnaissance Office in Chantilly, VA. He is a contracting professional with over 30 years combined 
experience with industry and government. Pickarz is responsible for managing a contracts portfolio 
valued in excess of $1.5 billion that provides IT infrastructure, hardware, software, and network 
support for intelligence community stakeholders worldwide. 
Abstract 
Competition is repeatedly cited in the acquisition world as a powerful tool, if not the most 
powerful tool, to ensure taxpayers get the most value for their tax dollars. A viable 
competition package (Request for Proposal [RFP], Statement of Work [SOW], Performance 
Work Statement [PWS], etc.) is not possible without having adequate technical data, 
computer software, and computer software documentation to provide to potential competitors 
to enable them to develop or evolve a system or support the solution needed. This paper first 
presents the acquisition professional with the knowledge to more effectively evaluate 
intellectual property in source selections to ensure the Government gets the intellectual 
property rights it needs to procure, support, and sustain systems the warfighter and others 
need; second, provides a structure and process to get these “rights” identified on contract 
while providing transparency for them throughout the period of performance; and, finally, 
presents a different way to look at the “necessary” rights when viewed from an open system 
architecture perspective. 
Introduction 
Better Buying Power (BBP) 2.0 challenged the Department of Defense (DoD) to “do 
more without more.” One focus area was to “promote effective competition” (Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [USD(AT&L)], 2013, 
p. 17). Competition is repeatedly cited in the acquisition world as a powerful tool, if not the 
most powerful tool, to ensure the taxpayer gets the most value for their tax dollars. It is very 
difficult, if not impossible, however, to develop a viable competition package (Request for 
Proposal [RFP], Statement of Work [SOW], Performance Work Statement [PWS], etc.) 
without having adequate technical data, computer software, and computer software 
documentation to provide to potential competitors to enable them to develop or evolve the 
system or support the solution needed. To this end, delivering the appropriate volume and 
content of technical data and computer software that are necessary to compete, support, 
and sustain weapon systems and their support infrastructures is critical.  
Promoting effective competition was also framed in the context of using Open 
Systems Architecture (OSA) approaches and managing technical data rights to foster those 
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architectures (OUSD[AT&L]), 2013, p. 18).1 Put quite simply, you can’t develop and maintain 
open architectures without access to the technical data and software they rely upon or at 
least utilize to some extent. BBP 3.0 does not abandon the progress of the two previous 
BBP releases. Rather, it  
continues the focus on continuous improvement with a new emphasis on 
initiatives that encourage innovation and promote technical excellence with 
the overarching goal of ensuring that the United States’ military has the 
dominant capabilities to meet future national security requirements. 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2014, p. 2) 
OSA continues to be a BBP focus to stimulate technology insertion to keep pace with 
technology innovations and enable the design agility needed to keep ahead of our 
adversaries. We simply cannot effectively “refresh” our designs without the tools to foster 
these refresh cycles. The modularity of OSA not only stimulates innovation, but fosters 
competition as well from new entrants to the market from which to leverage not only 
commercial technology but new designs as well.  
This paper is not a “how-to guide” to implement OSA from a technical perspective. It 
does, however, provide an approach to aid acquisition professionals in structuring RFPs, 
evaluating them, and making best value award decisions in competitive acquisitions. In 
other words, how to get OSA on contract more effectively. What is unique in this approach is 
that it fosters significantly improved management and insight of technical data rights and 
computer software toward an end goal of implementing an open systems approach both for 
the instant contract and those that follow. This approach results in the program managers 
and their acquisition teams knowing exactly what intellectual property (IP), which includes 
not only non-commercial data rights but also commercial software, commercial technical 
data, and patented inventions, are incorporated into a contractor’s technical solution and 
how any restrictions impact the final deliverables from a future support, sustainment, and 
competition perspective.  
Background 
The two primary parts within acquisition regulations discussed herein are the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 15 (Contracting by Negotiation), specifically, Subpart 15.1 
Source Selection Processes and Techniques; and DoD FAR Supplement (DFARS) Part 227 
(Patents, Data, and Copyrights), specifically, Subpart 227.71 (Rights in Technical Data) and 
Subpart 227.72 (Rights in Computer Software and Computer Software Documentation). It is 
where these two parts of the acquisition regulations intersect that we need to leverage to 
ensure the Government communicates what it needs with respect to intellectual property 
(IP). Getting the IP the Government needs is not an “option,” as the DoDI 5000.2 clearly 
levies this responsibility to program managers where it states, 
Program management must establish and maintain an IP Strategy to identify 
and manage the full spectrum of IP and related issues (e.g., technical data 
and computer software deliverables, patented technologies, and appropriate 
                                            
 
 
1 The essence of Open Systems Architecture (OSA) is organized decomposition, using carefully 
defined execution boundaries, layered onto a framework of software and hardware shared services 
and a vibrant business model that facilitates competition. For a full description, see (DoD, 2013, p. iii). 
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license rights) from the inception of a program and throughout the life cycle. 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2015, p. 76) 
This “IP Strategy” can only be effectively executed when the Government knows 
where IP is embedded within its components, items, and processes. Program managers and 
their acquisition team need to be in front of the IP challenge at the beginning of acquisitions 
during the RFP phase. If an IP Strategy and its related issues related to missing data, 
computer software, and the necessary rights and licenses to use them is implemented well 
into a program’s schedule, it is too late to capture the savings possible through competition. 
Before you build an RFP, you have to first have a Source Selection Plan (SSP) that you 
must follow toward contract award. A brief discussion of where in the source selection 
process IP can be better communicated and evaluated is useful to provide context of the 
recommended solutions presented herein. 
The Source Selection Process and IP Focus Areas 
A top-level source selection process is shown in Figure 1. This figure does not 
attempt to capture every potential step and process (for example, conducting clarifications 
or awarding without discussions). It serves only to highlight where this paper identifies the 
impacts evaluating IP has on the overall competitive proposal/source selection process. The 
light shaded boxes reflect the key areas this paper will elaborate on. The SSP, the 
importance of evaluating and scoring/rating IP, communicating what the Government wants 
through the RFP, evaluating proposals, and selecting the best value offer using IP as a 




Establishing a Sound IP Strategy in Source Selections and Communicating It 
Clearly to Industry Is Critical 
An SSP is required for all best-value, negotiated, competitive acquisitions under FAR 
Part 15 (OUSD[AT&L], 2011). It is within the SSP where IP can be identified as part of the 
evaluation criteria as either a factor or sub-factor. The more importantly IP is weighted within 
the total set of criteria will directly determine how much attention offerors pay to it with 
respect to winning the competition. The RFP must be developed to align exactly with the 
SSP with respect to process and the criteria to evaluate the offerors’ proposals. The RFP 
must also clearly communicate (through Section L, Instructions to Offerors) how to structure 
and present their proposal with respect to the criteria by which it will be evaluated.  
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Evaluation Criteria—Structure With Caution 
The government has wide latitude with which to establish its requirements and needs 
and exercise judgment when evaluating offerors’ proposals. The General Accountability 
Office, in adjudicating hundreds of protests, has consistently opined that in reviewing a 
protest against an agency’s evaluation of proposals, it will not substitute its (or the 
protester’s) judgment for that of the agency; rather, it will examine the record to determine 
whether the agency’s judgments were reasonable and consistent with the stated evaluation 
criteria and applicable procurement statutes and regulations.2 The evaluation of proposals is 
therefore a matter within an agency’s broad discretion, since the agency (not Industry) 
[emphasis added] is responsible for defining its needs and the best method for 
accommodating them.3 What this means with respect to establishing IP as an evaluation 
criteria is that it is completely acceptable to do so. Just because an offeror is unhappy with 
how the IP (delivered with its solution to the Government’s requirements) was scored, does 
not, in and of itself, establish that the Government acted unreasonably. The Government is 
simply determining that the solution (with the related IP) did not represent the best value to 
the Government. All that being said, there are still some fundamental pitfalls that can derail 
an otherwise sound IP strategy.  
There are some limitations with respect to IP that must be recognized and respected. 
The Government cannot “force” a relinquishment of rights to data (and computer software) 
that was independently developed at private expense. This restriction is well founded in the 
U.S. Code and the DFARS.4 That doesn’t, however, preclude the Government from 
identifying its minimum needs for IP and evaluating the impacts restrictive IP elements (data 
and computer software) have on the best value determination. There are two basic ways to 
evaluate IP in the competitive proposal process, scoring IP as a criteria (factor or subfactor) 
or as an overall IP “Risk Assessment.” 
Aligning Evaluation Criteria With Ratings and/or Risk Assessments 
When establishing evaluation criteria with their respective factors and subfactors, the 
Government must communicate not only how ratings/scores will be assigned, but also when 
the various standards have been met. There is great latitude with how to establish scoring 
methodologies, from numerical, algebraic, narrative, to adjectival. Since IP is very complex 
to identify and evaluate, adjectival and narrative have the most merit. An example of a 
previously used adjectival rating scale can be found in Table 1. 
                                            
 
 
2 See GAO Protest Decision, B-406505; B-406405.2, dated May 21, 2012. 
3 See GAO Protest Decision, B-406505; B-406405.2, dated May 21, 2012. 
4 See 10 U.S.C 2320(F) and DFARS 227.7103-1(c), 227.7203-1(c). 
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Table 1. Technical-Management Rating Scale* 
 
One of the subfactors under the Technical-Management Factor was Innovation 
Approach (the highest of three total subfactors). Under this subfactor, the Government 
evaluated the offerors’ ability to identify and apply innovative methods of producing domain 
understanding and domain knowledge from multi-source, multi-dimensional data. The 
Government also evaluated the offerors’ ability to identify and apply innovative methods of 
automation human-computer interaction, data uncertainty management, and data pedigree 
maintenance. Lastly, the Government evaluated the offerors’ ability to minimize technology 
transition costs. While it’s not important for the reader to understand the technical nuances 
of this technical factor, it is important to focus on the last sentence of the factor from an IP 
perspective. This is because unless the Government has the appropriate rights and licenses 
to the IP necessary to execute the offeror’s technical solution, transitioning the technology 
developed and deployed across the Government’s organization will be cost prohibitive and 
potentially lead to a long term sole source acquisition situation. 
To ensure that IP independently developed at private expense (as discussed earlier) 
is not a “condition of offer” or that the solicitation “forces” a relinquishment of the same, the 
“standards” by which the subfactors will be evaluated against must clearly convey this. To 
this end, the standards associated with the above Innovative Approach subfactor stated that 
the standard would be met when the Offeror 
described the extent to which the rights in Technical Data (TD), Computer 
Software (CS), and Computer Software Documentation (CSD), and 
inventions/patents offered to the Government ensured unimpeded, 
innovative, and cost effective production, operation, maintenance, and 
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upgrade of the [System Name] processing prototypes throughout its 
lifecycle; allow for open and competitive procurement of [System Name] 
enhancements; and permit the transfer of [System Name] TD, CSD, and CS 
to other systems or platforms.  
Note the power of this one standard. In it, nine best value tradeoffs can be identified 
that are directly attributable to IP rights and licenses (unimpeded, innovative, cost effective, 
production, operations, maintenance, upgrade, future competitions, transfer to other 
systems or platforms).  
The standard went on to ensure that 
proposals will not be rated less that SATISFACTORY on this standard solely 
because an offeror does not offer a price for all items delivered with 
Government Purpose Rights. However, rating on this factor for proposals to 
deliver TD, CSD, and CS with less than the minimum rights specified for the 
Government by applicable statute (10 U.S.C. 2320) and regulation DFARS 
252.227-7013, 252.227-7014, and 252.227-7015 may be negatively 
impacted. For non-commercial acquisitions, these rights include Unlimited 
Rights in TD, CS, and CSD as specified in DFARS 252.227-7013 & 252.227-
7014, Limited Rights in TD as specified in DFARS 252.227-7013, and 
Restricted Rights in CS as specified in DFARS 252.227-7014. The minimum 
rights considered for TD associated with commercial item acquisitions are 
specified in DFARS 252.227-7015. For commercial CS acquisitions, 
evaluation of the offered license rights will assess the licenses customarily 
provided to the public with respect to their consistency with Federal 
procurement law and satisfaction of Government user needs as set forth in 
the solicitation.  
The key to having enough insight into the offeror’s proposal regarding the IP strategy 
reflected in the subfactor and its related standard is to “map” the IP within the proposal. This 
will be discussed later on. An alternative to “scoring” IP is to evaluate IP from an overall 
“Risk” perspective. To this end, an IP Risk Evaluation example is presented next. 
To simplify the evaluation of IP in a source selection, some acquisition teams have 
chosen to assess overall IP “Risk” as reflected in an offeror’s proposed technical solution. 
As example of this was where the Government evaluated Intellectual Property Risk as 
the extent to which the Intellectual Property in technical data, computer 
software and computer software documentation and inventions/patents 
offered to the Government will: 
 Ensure unimpeded, innovative and cost effective production, operation, 
maintenance, and upgrade of the capability/service throughout the  
 [System Name] life cycle 
 Allow for open and competitive procurement of enhancements; and will 
permit the transfer of technical data of non-proprietary object and code and 
source code to other contractors for use on other systems or platforms. (DoD, 
2013) 
This example used a Risk Rating table as shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Intellectual Property Risk 
 
The “risk evaluation” approach implemented by Table 2 provides for assessing the 
impact of IP on the overall proposed solution across all the technical areas, vice a specific 
factor or subfactor as presented earlier. This gives the evaluation team even more flexibility 
and is actually easier to document in the IP evaluation. While both approaches, the “factor” 
approach and the “risk” approach, have great merit, they both require adequate clarity with 
respect to the identification of the IP throughout the offeror’s proposal. This is facilitated by 
the standard “assertions process” required in DFARS 252.227-7017 and standard Section 
K, Representations and Certifications, Provisions, but the methodology presented herein 
takes these longstanding processes to a much higher level.  
Evaluating Initial Proposals 
Figuring out where IP is buried within a contractor’s proposal, or more importantly, 
within the proposed solution, is not easy. This is because the primary enabling clauses rely 
upon Section K, which normally brings in the Assertions Clause, 252.227-7017 (the -7017 
clause), the Prior Delivery Clause, 252.227-7028 (the -7028 clause), and the required FAR 
assertions pursuant to the necessary Patent clauses in the contract when applicable 
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(52.227-6, 52.227-7, 52.227-9, 52.227-10).5 Unfortunately, even though the assertions 
become a part of the resulting contract, many elements of Section K are long forgotten after 
contract award. The net result is that IP is many times a proposal element that is 
overlooked, and it may come back to haunt the Government when the “impact” of the 
assertions become apparent upon delivery or earlier during contract performance. What is 
needed is a better methodology and form with which to identify and evaluate IP during the 
proposal evaluation process. One proven method is to leverage the assertions process. 
Leveraging the “Assertions Process” to Expand Clarity and Purpose 
The Assertions Process 
IP can be some of a company’s most valuable assets, the relinquishment of which 
can significantly impact not only their profitability, but their long-term survival as well. As a 
result, it is in their best interests to protect them to the maximum extent possible. While only 
one small component of data rights management, the “assertion step” is important to 
understand both pre and post award as there are different standards and responsibilities 
tied to each. Unfortunately, the assertions required by the -7017 clause leaves a lot of 
uncertainly with respect to just “where” the restricted elements reside in the technical 
solution or services provided. The “Intellectual Property Attachment” methodology provided 
herein represents a best practice that “maps” the contract line items (CLINS), the Contract 
Data Requirements List (CDRL) items, the minimum data rights the Government has 
determined necessary for each deliverable, the Statement Of Work (SOW)/Performance 
Work Statement (PWS), the Data Rights that will be delivered; and other IP (patented 
inventions), all in one contract attachment with seven tables that live throughout the life of 
the contract. This approach facilitates efficient and thorough evaluation of IP both for initial 
proposals and final proposal revisions. It also establishes an additional vantage point from 
which to eliminate weak proposals from the competitive range and to establish another 
element of the “responsiveness” determination of proposals.  
Rather than attempt to explain all the nuances and entitlements of the various 
categories of data rights, commercial technical data and software terms and conditions and 
patents/inventions, which are beyond the scope of this paper, the important takeaway is that 
the acquisition professional must clearly understand the nature and content of the technical 
data and computer software (both commercial and non-commercial) they identify as required 
to meet their minimum needs to execute their particular contract/program.  
What may not be so obvious to the acquisition professional is that assertions are a 
critical precursor to being able to mark any deliverable containing technical data or computer 
software with any restrictive marking, post award. In other words, if a deliverable contains 
such non-commercial intellectual property, identifying the items, the basis for the restrictive 
marking and what restrictive category is applicable is required before delivering with a 
restrictive marking affixed to the specific data items. The DFARS requires these assertions 
be furnished to the Government and identified in “an attachment” to the contract prior to the 
delivery of any data with restrictive data (DFARS 227.227-7013(e)(2)). The DFARS goes on 
                                            
 
 
5 Managing inventions and the patents that register them is not a primary focus of this paper due to 
the complexities of this topic and page limitations. The identification of them is however important and 
is presented later. 
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to cite the -7017 clause as the provision to facilitate this identification process, or for our 
purpose here the assertions necessary as a precursor to affixing restrictive markings on 
deliverables (DFARS 227-7103-3(b)). This Assertions List then becomes attached to the 
contract (DFARS 227-7103-10(a)(3)). 
In like fashion, the DFARS requires the identification of computer software and 
computer software documentation to be furnished with restrictions prior to delivery (DFARS 
252.227-7014(e)(2)). As with Technical Data, the -7017 clause is used again to facilitate the 
same due diligence actions by the contractor discussed earlier. It bears repeating again that 
unless a restriction is asserted, no restrictive markings may be affixed to the final software. 
(This is normally done via “code headers” within the software itself and the marking of the 
physical documentation of the software.) Both Government and contractor alike should take 
extreme care during the software acceptance process to ensure that non-commercial 
computer software is scanned to identify any internal restrictive markings as they can 
coexist with a transmittal letter that alludes to something else. Once incongruent markings 
are identified, the corrective actions may be invoked as set forth in both the -7013 clause 
and the -7014 clause.  
Before we get to the details of the Assertion List itself developed pursuant to the -
7017 clause, the causal link between assertion and delivery is useful to revisit. If you read 
both the -7013 and -7014 clauses carefully you will note that the activity of delivery is woven 
throughout. Thus the action of delivery is required to empower the Government to assert its 
data rights on the non-commercial Technical Data or Computer Software in question. As 
explained previously, any restrictions must be “asserted” prior to any such delivery. But 
before any such assertions may be made, the specific technical data or computer software 
must be “identified” as required for delivery. This is an important sequence of events that 
must take place to effectively manage data and the protection thereof. In other words, no 
assertion, no restrictive marking authorized if you are the contractor. But if you are the 
Government, beware, because without a requirement for “delivery” the contractor is not 
bound to identify or assert any restrictions. Only if delivery is later called for (via deferred 
ordering) or identified as a post award assertion (which has more strict limitations than pre-
award assertions) will the identification and the restrictions be brought to light.6  
Let’s now turn to one of the key elements of the discussion, namely, the Assertions 
List, or more importantly the -7017 clause elements that lead to the “List” or “Attachment” 
itself. This is the traditional methodology (combined with attaching commercial software 
licenses to the contract and citing patent royalty information in Section K, as discussed 
earlier).  
Since this is so critical to the discussion here, the elements of the clause are 
provided in Table 3.  
                                            
 
 
6 See DFARS 252.227-7013(e)(3), 252.227-7014(e)(3), and 252.227-7018(e)(3). 
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Table 3. -7107 Clause Elements 
(DFARS 252.227-7017(e)(3))7 
 
Columns two through four are the easiest to deal with. Column four is very 
straightforward: who is the right person to sign off. Column three is fairly simple as well: it’s 
either Restricted Rights (for software), Limited Rights (for technical data, (SBIR Rights), or 
Government Purpose Rights (where mixed funds are/were used). Column two, the basis 
column, is pretty straightforward as well, and it usually reads “Independently Developed at 
Private Expense” or “Jointly Developed with Contractor and Governments funds.” If you look 
at the information sought in column one, however, it may be interpreted in some instances 
ambiguously. Just what is required to “identify the technical data, computer software or 
computer software documentation”? An ambiguous assertion example could be “All XYZ 
software utilized in the ABC assembly.” This “notional” top level data description is extremely 
                                            
 
 
7 Note that the -7013, -7014, and -7018 clauses all have an identical table with some of the instruction 
language that is to be used for post award assertions. 
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problematic for two main reasons. First, the Government has no clue “what” software is 
being restricted (assuming, of course, Column three would indicate “Restricted Rights”), and 
second, the Government really doesn’t know clearly “what” software it really should be 
protecting with that level of restriction, where within the system or architecture design the 
restricted software resides, nor what it is really getting for its money. True, it is easy to 
simply say “all,” but is it fair and accurate? Most would agree, it’s not. You can’t really 
determine what you “need” to field, support, and sustain a system without knowing what you 
“have” to begin with (Pickarz, September 2012). In this instance, you just don’t know and 
most importantly, you have no baseline at contract award from which to later determine what 
changes the Government has funded and may have unlimited rights to.8 A huge entitlement 
may be lost from simply not paying attention to the assertions contained in the Assertions 
List. The solution to this dilemma is actually quite simple. Namely, make the instructions 
unequivocally clear. A formal deviation to the clause is probably not a timely solution. A 
better solution is clearer instructions to the contractor in the solicitation in Section L 
(Instructions to Offerors) with a resultant attachment to the contract that documents the 
technical data and computer software and their respective rights to be given to the 
Government. It is much better to articulate just what you expect the contractor to deliver in 
their proposal rather than have them guess. For the example earlier, the software version(s), 
and/or dates should be given to clearly identify just what will be restricted upon delivery. 
Even better, if you make clarity of the assertions a condition of offer, contractors will always 
comply or possibly lose the award. Let me be clear, however, as the DFARS deals with this 
very situation where it states, 
If an offeror fails to submit the attachment or fails to complete the attachment 
in accordance with the requirements of the solicitation provision, such failure 
shall constitute a minor informality. Provide offerors an opportunity to remedy 
a minor informality in accordance with the procedures at FAR 14.405 or 
15.607. An offeror’s failure to correct the informality within the time prescribed 
by the contracting officer shall render the offer ineligible for award. (DFARS 
227.7103-10(a)(1)) 
Note that while clarity would be considered a “minor informality,” failure to correct this 
shall render the offer ineligible for award. Another key point is that a minor informality could 
be resolved as a “minor error” pursuant to a “clarification” vice a “discussion” point, thereby 
preserving to ability to award without discussions should this be provided for in the 
solicitation (FAR 15.306(a)(2)). At the end of the day, additional emphasis in the instructions 
for completing the assertions goes a long way to enable the Government to later assert the 
rights it has paid for.  
The Intellectual Property Attachment—Mapping Critical IP Artifacts  
Non-commercial technical data and computer software assertions are really only part 
of the intellectual property portfolio as there are numerous commercial technical data and 
computer software artifacts, and in many cases previously developed inventions, that are 
relevant to Government contracts. The answer to the question, “What do I have?” is 
important not only at contract award but throughout contract performance as the 
                                            
 
 
8 See DFARS 252.227-7013(b)(1), 252.227-7014(b)(1). 
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deliverables from one contract provide the building blocks for another contracts and their 
programs/projects. All this assertion information can be captured in one place both to 
evaluate the proposal and then continue throughout contract performance as a living 
document. This is accomplished by adding an “Intellectual Property Volume” to your 
solicitation and the resulting “Intellectual Property Attachment” to the awarded contract. 
This original idea was first promulgated by Space and Missile Center (SMC) in Los 
Angeles and presented in the SMC Office of the Staff Judge Advocate Guide Acquiring and 
Enforcing the Government’s Rights in Technical Data and Computer Software Under 
Department of Defense Contracts: A Practical Handbook for Acquisition Professionals 
(Space and Missile Center [SMC] Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, March 2014). Now in 
its Sixth edition, this somewhat daunting document may seem to be a bit difficult to review at 
first, but searching for the “Data Rights Attachment” will get you to most of the components 
discussed herein. For the purposes of this paper, I will take SMC/JA’s approach and expand 
it to provide a comprehensive “Volume” to the proposal that lays out not only the Data 
Rights attributable to the effort but other areas of intellectual property as well. To do this, an 
Intellectual Property Volume is required from offerors. This volume would be structured as 
follows: 
Volume “X”—Intellectual Property9 
 Table 1—Data Rights Summary: Non-Commercial Technical Data and 
Computer Software & Computer Software Documentation 
 Table 2—Commercial Technical Data and Computer Software & Computer 
Software Documentation  
 Table 3—Assertions List: Non-Commercial Technical Data, Computer 
Software, and Computer Software Documentation 
 Table 4—Specifically Negotiated Licenses (Special Licenses to Non-
Commercial Technical Data and Computer Software) 
 Table 5—Rights in Background Inventions 
 Table 6—Third Party Patent Rights and Royalties 
It helps to visualize the Intellectual Property Volume approach so the following 
notional tables with example deliverable technical data and computer software deliverables 
are provided. The various elements of the tables and their mapping functions will be 
discussed.  
                                            
 
 
9 While this paper focuses on “data rights,” Tables 6 and 7 are provided and briefly discussed to add 
the listing of any relevant inventions (Patents) used in the contractor’s proposed solution. This 
incorporation then provides a comprehensive IP attachment to the contract. 
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Table 4. Data Rights Summary  
Non-Commercial Technical Data and Computer Software and Computer 
Software Documentation 
 
As you can see from the Data Rights Summary table, the data rights the Government 
will receive are clearly “mapped” to the contract’s Contract Line Items (CLINs), Contract 
Data Requirements Lists (CDRLS), and the SOW/PWS. CLIN 0002 in this particular 
solicitation was for “Data,” and a few notional items are presented. But there’s some 
important nuances to take note of that reflect the true power of this approach. Note first that 
the Government has clearly identified what its minimum needs are for this acquisition in 
Column 5. Note also that the User Manuals constitute OMIT data, which entitles the 
Government to Unlimited Rights, so this cell in the table has been “pre-filled” to establish this 
entitlement. The Contract Funds Status Report (CFSR) is marked N/A. This is because the 
CFSR constitutes financial data that is incidental to contract administration and outside the 
definition of “Technical Data,” which triggers the applicability of the various rights outlined in 
the clauses. Finally, Column 8 provides the ability for offerors to explain why the rights 
proposed do not meet the Government’s minimum needs (again to preclude forcing the 
relinquishment of rights to independently developed technical data or computer software.) 
This table from the proposal will become an attachment to the contract and a “living” 
document (as will all the tables discussed here) to provide for adding post award assertions 
and afford the Government complete Intellectual Property situational awareness.  
Table 5 provides the insight to any commercial technical data or computer software 
the contractor must deliver under the contract. This table contains nine columns.  
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Table 5. Commercial Technical Data, Computer Software, and Computer 
Software Documentation 
 
In like fashion of the other tables, the first three columns provide for CLINs, CDRLS 
and SOW/PWS paragraphs that are mapped to the commercial technical data and 
commercial computer software that are to be delivered that is provided for in the proposal. 
Instructions in Section L will again guide offerors how to populate the table. The 
Government needs to ensure that identifying commercial software is not enough, and Open 
Source Software (OSS) and other openly shared software must also be identified since they 
are also commercial products in nature. This is because even though a software artifact may 
be “open,” it still has terms and conditions by which it must be shared. The commercial 
license terms can be problematic and the Government may have concerns regarding these 
commercial technical data and computer software licenses and these must be adjudicated. 
Some of these concerns relate to the following: 
 Subsequent rights to updates, software maintenance patches, minor version 
changes and substitutions provided at no additional cost 
 License transferability to the Government (for option exercise and 
CDRL/CLIN delivery) 
 Disputes provisions 
 Choice of law provisions 
 Payment of attorney’s fees 
 Automatic renewal provisions that violate the Anti-Deficiency Act 
 Provisions that prohibit disclosure of license terms/conditions 
 Open Source Software terms that mandate sharing and posting of changes 
when doing so may jeopardize national security 
Of course the Government has no idea if any of these unwanted terms are embodied 
within the commercial licenses unless the offeror is instructed to actually provide all licenses 
as an addendum to the table in the IP Volume. Once provided, the Government can perform 
its due diligence. There have been instances where offerors have claimed that license terms 
cannot be provided until the licenses are executed after award and failed to provide copies 
of the standard licenses normally required from commercial vendors. This argument is not 
completely true. While it is true that the final license will reflect the actual terms and 
conditions agreed to, virtually every commercial software product (or standard technical data 
documentation) has a standard license that is at least the starting point for negotiating the 
final terms. These “standard” licenses must be provided to enable a thorough proposal 
review and to develop clarification questions, information requests, and assign strengths, 
weaknesses, or deficiencies. In the event terms that are not acceptable to the Government 
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are unable to be removed, then it is a good practice to establish an overall Intellectual 
Property “Risk” rating to capture the additional risk to the Government from the restrictive 
terms as was discussed earlier.  
The Assertions List, generated in response to the -7017 clause, is provided for in 
Table 6 of the IP Volume and again maps the restrictions and data rights proposed to the 
Government’s requirements laid out in the CLINs, CDRLs, and SOW/PWS. The additional 
benefit this approach establishes is that the clarity needed to effectively manage the 
Technical Data and Computer Software is mandated as a consideration of responsiveness 
to the solicitation. It is important to understand the difference between Table 4, which 
identifies the overall data rights assigned to the various data items, to Table 6, The 
Assertions List. Table 4 assigns the data rights, but Table 6 identifies the specific restrictive 
items (if any) that are tied to the restrictions. In other words just “what” makes the 
deliverable Limited Rights technical data. These assertions are also required for those 
instances where the Government identifies Government Purpose Rights (GPR) as its 
minimum and the contractor proposes GPR. This is because there are still elements or 
activities of GPR that provide for additional due diligence on the part of the Government 
when sharing with third parties (additional Non-Disclosure Agreements, for example). The 
Assertions List would thus look similar to that shown in Table 6.  
Table 6. Assertions List—Non-Commercial Technical Data, Computer Software, 
and Computer Software Documentation 
 
The “prior delivery list,” generated in response to the -7028 clause, is provided for in 
Table 7 and maps the technical data and computer software that was delivered to the 
Government prior to the current effort (or is scheduled to be delivered on another ongoing 
contract). Readers should keep in mind, however, that unless there were deliveries earlier in 
time (or planned for the future) that would be subject to reporting in the table, the offeror will 
simply report “none.” Again, delivery is paramount for the successful functioning of various 
clauses and the rights they impose. In addition to the standard information required, the 
relevant CDRLs are identified, as well as all contract information from which the items 
were/are to be delivered that are identical or substantially similar to documents or other 
media that the offeror has produced for, delivered to, or is obligated to deliver to the 
Government under any contract or subcontract (DFARS 252.227-7028).  
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Table 7. Prior Delivery List for Technical Data or Computer Software 
 
Table 8 constitutes the identification of any Special Licenses relevant to a specific 
CDRL data item. It is important that the scope or terms and conditions of any special license 
be clearly articulated in the proposal and a copy of the actual license to be executed be 
provided as an Addendum to Table 8 for subsequent review, evaluation by the Government, 
and incorporation into the contract as an attachment. A notional format for Table 8 can be 
found below. 
Table 8. Specifically Negotiated Licenses (Special Licenses)—Non-Commercial 
Technical Data and Computer Software) 
 
Table 9 provides the insight to any inventions the contractor plans to incorporate into 
any component, item, or process. A “background invention” is any invention, other than a 
subject invention, that is covered by any patent or pending patent application in which the 
offeror (including its sub-offerors or suppliers, or potential sub-offerors or suppliers at any 
tier) (1) has any right, title, or interest; and (2) proposes to incorporate into any items, 
components, or processes to be developed or delivered, or that will be described or 
disclosed in an technical data, computer software, or computer software documentation to 
be developed or delivered under the resulting contract (DoD, May 2013). This table contains 
six columns.  
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Table 9. Rights in Background Inventions1 
 
1. The Patent rights clauses of the solicitation provide additional guidance regarding the identification and 
management of inventions used on the contract. The purpose of this table is to capture the 
inventions/patents to be incorporated in one place as an attachment to the contract to preclude losing 
their identity as part of the technical baseline after the initial award is completed.10 
Table 10 provides the insight to any third-party patent rights for which the contractor 
plans to pay royalties. This table provides information concerning these third-party patents 
and the amount of the royalties it will pay in order to perform under the contract. This table 
contains seven columns.  
Table 10. Third Party Patent Rights and Royalties1  
 
Communicating the Government’s Expectations Is Vital to Success 
The acquisition team crafting the RFP needs to pay close attention when drafting the 
instructions in Section L related to the Intellectual Property Volume. Explaining what is 
needed within the various tables ensures all offerors have a common understanding. Trying 
to avoid specifying the “table format” and just provide Section L language tends to give 
inconsistent results and lead to more clarifications and/or discussions. Some offerors will 
interpret the instructions differently, and the result is data rights information spread across 
the proposal and is a virtual “scavenger hunt” to figure out just what IP impacts there are in 
                                            
 
 
10 The identification of inventions to be used in a contractors technical solution described in their 
proposal is normally required in Section K of the solicitations. This completed section is, however, 
buried in the contract file documentation at contract award and can be difficult to locate in a 
voluminous contract file. The table methodology presented here keeps it at the forefront of the 
acquisition team to manage throughout the contract period of performance. 
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offerors’ proposals. The best approach is a Tabular One by IP topic and then incorporate the 
individual tables as “Tabs,” with clear instructions to populate the tables. Finally, the 
Government must ensure that updates to the various IP tables in the IP Attachment are 
reviewed and approved prior to incorporating the technical changes reflected in the 
projected updates during post award performance. This is to ensure configuration 
management of the technical changes is carefully managed and maintained. 
Open Systems Architecture (OSA)—Where Does It Fit? 
Open Systems Architecture provides for designs that accommodate updated 
technology (data and computer software) by leveraging modular, loosely coupled and highly 
cohesive components within a system. A system should be designed in major “modules” 
where potentially proprietary data and/or computer software is “encapsulated” (i.e., 
segregated within the design). These modules must be “loosely coupled” whereby individual 
modules do not depend upon each other to enable the entire system to function.) Lastly, the 
modules must be highly cohesive so the module functionality works together via common 
standards. The system relies on open interfaces well known by all competitors to enhance 
future competitions as well as more effective sustainment and supportability. This approach 
enables even highly restrictive and even proprietary designs to be incorporated into the final 
system yet still enable technology insertion with new and innovative upgrades. It is only 
made possible, however, if the “critical” IP components are or have been delivered to the 
Government earlier in the system’s life cycle. Knowing where the IP is embedded within the 
various designs fosters this approach as well by enabling strategic decisions where to focus 
on “opening up” the system for more competition and technology insertion. The IP Volume 
discussed earlier provides for the situational awareness necessary to bring it all together. 
For a thorough discussion on Open Systems Architecture and multiple examples and 
guides, readers should review the OSA Guidebook for Program Managers (DoD, May 2013). 
Government Insistence on Additional Openness and IP Rights—Is It Viable? 
It is important to discern whether or not the Government, in implementing the 
processes and strategies presented here can be sustained and implemented when 
challenged by Industry. There are numerous Government Accountability Office (GAO) bid 
protest decisions that have upheld the Government’s decisions which supports the concepts 
presented herein. What is important to take away from these decisions are some key 
principles that when adhered to, result in new IP and OSA strategies that are executable 
and sustainable when challenged. 
As stated earlier, if the Government establishes a plan to evaluate proposals (a 
source selection plan), follows the plan, consistently applies the criteria and their standards 
fairly to all offerors, then makes a best value decision based upon all evaluation areas (cost 
and non-cost), the GAO will not overturn the Government’s decision. This has been a 
consistent result in multiple bid protest decisions. Can the Government use Open 
Architecture as a criteria in source selection? Can it require offerors to clearly identify what 
data rights the Government will obtain with an offeror’s proposed design/solution? Finally, 
can the Government make a best value decision using Open Systems Architecture 
(OSA/OA) and the delivered data rights for the technical data and computer software 
artifacts? The answer to all is unequivocally, yes. 
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A recent bid protest concerning an Engagement Skills Training (EST) system will 
help illustrate.11 In this instance, the Government provided for an Open Architecture 
subfactor to assess the ability of the offeror’s design to “fully support, maintain, and modify 
the EST software and technical data throughout the program life cycle to include the legacy 
EST systems, weapons and scenarios.”12 The acquisition team evaluated the proposals 
using the scales and criteria called out in their RFP. During the evaluation the team 
identified several areas where the Government’s license rights were cited inconsistently in 
different sections of an offeror’s proposal. Because of this, the evaluation team was unsure 
just what rights the Government would receive. A lower “marginal’ rating under the open 
architecture subfactor was then assigned. The ambiguity was created by the offeror in the 
errors it submitted related to a material aspect of the technical approach regarding open 
architecture.13 Specifically, the inability of the Government to share many IP artifacts of 
technical data and computer software. The unsuccessful offeror challenged other areas of 
the evaluation but these will not be recounted here for the sake of brevity. The lessons 
learned are important, however. First, if the Government communicates what it will evaluate, 
how it will evaluate, and what will be taken into consideration in the best value decision, the 
GAO will support the Government’s decision. Second, it’s not the Government’s job to 
“rewrite” the offeror’s proposals and identify each and every error and weakness identified. 
The FAR requires agencies conducting discussions with offerors to address, “at a minimum 
… deficiencies, significant weaknesses and adverse past performance information to which 
the offeror has not yet had an opportunity to respond” (FAR 15.306(d)(3)). The Government 
does not have to “spoon feed” an offeror as to each and every item that could be revised to 
improve and offeror’s proposal.14 Finally, data rights can be directly rated and scored in a 
competitive source selection to enable the Government to make a best value decision. 
In another bid protest decision, the Governments requirement was for a commercial 
off-the-shelf, “web-based, automated e-Recruitment solution, including all software, software 
documentation, implementation support, and services to support the full life cycle of an 
enterprise-wide hiring/recruitment system.”15 An unsuccessful offeror did not include an 
adequate explanation, as requested by the solicitation, of the proposal’s compliance with the 
solicitation’s minimum mandatory requirements concerning intellectual property/data rights.16 
At issue were terms of the license whereby the agency’s data once entered into the offeror’s 
database became the property of the offeror. This was because a term of the license 
required all data be identified prior to contract start. Since the goal of the project was to 
manage employment and other HR data throughout the period of performance, this did not 
meet a material requirement of the RFP which was clearly called out in a mandatory 
“functional requirements matrix.” The offeror’s proposal was scored commensurately and 
they were eliminated from the competitive range. This protest illustrates a critical lesson 
relevant to our discussion here. Namely, establishing material requirements in an RFP is 
something that standard commercial licenses may be in conflict with. Recall the language in 
both the “Scoring” and “Risk” approaches to evaluating IP discussed earlier. In both, 
                                            
 
 
11 See GAO Bid Protest B-410006; B-410006.2, dated October 8, 2014. 
12 See GAO Bid Protest B-410006; B-410006.2, dated October 8, 2014. 
13 See GAO Bid Protest B-410006; B-410006.2, dated October 8, 2014. 
14 See GAO Bid Protest B-404671.2, B404671.4, dated April 8, 2011. 
15 See GAO Bid Protest B-298380.4, dated June 11, 2007. 
16 See GAO Bid Protest B-298380.4, dated June 11, 2007. 
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inconsistency with the “requirements of the RFP” and “satisfaction of Government user 
needs as set forth in the solicitation” were key discriminators. Thus, “hiding behind the 
commercial item veil” as it were, to claim that a standard commercial license may not be 
challenged regarding its terms and conditions is not sufficient to negate the basic needs of 
the Government for IP that effectively meet their needs. What is important is to provide an 
adequate license to meet the Government’s requirements called out in an RFP.  
Offerors should provide their best initial proposal in response to the Government’s 
RFP or risk being eliminated from the competitive range. This is an important point to 
understand as was illustrated in a recent bid protest where an offeror failed to provide 
significant material data and information required by RFP In Section L.17 The GAO has 
opined previously that “an offeror has the responsibility to submit a well-written proposal, 
with adequately detailed information that clearly demonstrates compliance with the 
solicitation requirements and allows a meaningful review by the procuring agency.”18 The 
offeror in this instance admitted it failed to provide information requested by the RFP and as 
a result their proposal failed to demonstrate that it met the solicitation requirements and they 
were eliminated from the competitive range. The lesson relevant to the discussion here, 
specifically to the IP Summary Attachment/Volume described earlier, is that unless an 
offeror pays close attention to the detailed instructions for this volume they run the risk of 
being eliminated from the competitive range. This is especially true when IP and the 
associated license rights and license terms and conditions are necessary to make a best 
value decision that has decision criteria based on IP and/or Open Architecture.  
Conclusion 
The goal of this paper was three-fold: first, to present the acquisition professional 
with some tools to ensure the Government gets the intellectual property rights it needs to 
procure, support, and sustain the systems the warfighter, and others, need; second, to 
provide a structure and process to get these rights identified on contract while providing 
transparency into them throughout the period of performance and not finding out “upon 
delivery” what rights are really being delivered; and finally, to present a different way to look 
at the “necessary” rights when viewed from an open architecture perspective. This is 
facilitated by strategically seeking the “necessary” IP rights (based upon the Government’s 
minimum needs) that focus on interfaces and other artifacts to implement an OSA approach. 
When this approach is implemented at the onset of a contract/program, restricted and 
limited rights become mitigated inhibitors to technology insertion and instead become 
catalysts to enable more affordable support, sustainment, and cost effective systems and 
solutions for the Government.  
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